Real money balances: a good forecasting device and a good policy target? by Anatol Balbach & Denis S. Karnosky
1;’
I OR the past two hundred years, economists have
debated the issue of the proper goals of monetary
policy. In times of strict adherence to the gold stand-
ard, the policy aspect of national money management
was of secondary importance. With fiat money and
loose or nonexistent ties to a commodity standard,
monetary policy became the ultimate determinant of
the quantity and quality of money stock. In a broad
sense, the goal that has emerged is to provide an
amount of money consistent with sustainable,economic
growth and the avoidance of such undesirable eco-
nomic conditions as inflation or recession.
Conducting monetary policy in such a noninflation-
ary and nonrecessionary manner, however, is some-
what more difficult than a casual investigation might
reveal. It is not simply the absolute quantity of money
in circulation that affects economic conditions; rather,
it is the relationship between the quantity of money
supplied and the quantity of money demanded.
The quantity of money supplied is controlled by the
Federal Reserve and can be measured, but an accept-
able measure of desired money balances is not yet in
the economist’s tool box. Money balances deflated by
some index of the general price level are often used
because they are supposed to reflect influences of both
money demand and supply. As a result, the concept
of real money balances has been advocated by some
analysts as a leading indicator of economic activity
and as an intermediate target of monetary policy. In
other words, it has been suggested that a decline in
observed real money balances leads to a decline in
economic activity and that monetary policy should
therefore be conducted so as to prevent such declines
in real balances.
Changes in observed real money balances, however,
do not necessarily indicate forthcoming changes in the
level of economic activity and, even if they frequently
have in the past, do not necessarily call for offsetting
changes in monetary policy. As a matter of fact,
changes in the nominal money stock designed to off-
set changes in real money balances can easily produce
procyclical effects and compound the very economic
problems which are supposedly being combatted. In
order to illustrate this point, a simplified theoretical
construct is described which utilizes real money bal-
ances in the decisionmaking process. Issues are raised
which pertain to the use of these balances as a target
of monetary policy and some evidence is presented
for the 1947-74 period.
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All decisionmaking units in society hold their
wealth in inventories of various assets. Businesses
have stocks of raw materials, finished goods, build-
ings, and machinery. Banks hold inventories of loans,
bonds, and real estate. Individual households keep
their wealth in the form of land, homes, automobiles,
stocks of food, clothing, labor skills, and financial in-
struments. All of these economic units have inventor-
ies of money — cash and/or demand deposits.
Some of these inventories are held because they
provide current services (homes, automobiles, food,
raw materials), some because they are expected to
provide future services (stocks, bonds), but most pro-
vide a combination of the two. Since at any given
time these inventories are viewed as an investment
portfolio, the value of each item depends upon its
convertibility into other goods and services, that is,
upon its generalized purchasing power. Consequently,
the value of each asset is perceived as its nominal
value (its current price multiplied by quantity) di-
vided by a general price index. This is the foundation
of the assertion that economic decisions are made on
the basis of real balances.
The size of an individual’s portfolio is a measure
of an individual’s wealth. The distribution among
various assets is determined by subjective tastes
and preferences, existing relative prices, and ex-
pectations as to future relative prices and the price
level. At any point in time an individual attempts to
arrange this portfolio in such a way as to maximize
the satisfaction derived from wealth. Any change in
wealth, tastes, relative prices, or expectations will pro-
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duce a discrepancy between the desired and actual
portfolio and a reshuffling of assets will result so as to
achieve a new equilibrium.
For example, an unexpectedly bountiful wheat crop
would increase the actual wheat balances of some
individuals above the desired level. With everything
else remaining constant, this would increase the
wealth of owners of wheat, and thereby total wealth,
and increase their desired balances of most other
items. In order to reduce wheat stocks to the desired
level and increase other balances to their equilibrium
size, economic units will attempt to exchange wheat
for money and money for other assets. In the process,
both the relative price of wheat and the general price
level will fall (increased aggregate wealth has caused
an increase in desired real money balances and since
actual money balances cannot be increased by the
private sector, the general price level must fall in or-
der for real money balances to reach their desired
level). Changes in the relative prices of existing assets
will then induce changes in the rates of production
of new assets and corresponding changes in the prices
of new output.
Although this analysis applies to any asset in the
portfolio, real money balances are especially crucial.
Autonomous changes in all sorts of assets can affect
economic activity, but the nominal stock of money is
controlled by monetary authorities. In a money econ-
omy any portfolio shuilling will disturb the inventory
of money (people seldom barter) and until desired
and actual real money balances are equated, changes
will continue. Thus, policy tools can be used to con-
trol or induce these portfolio changes.
For instance, suppose that an increase in the
nominal money stock causes actual real money bal-
ances to be larger than desired. In attempting to
reduce their balances (relative to other assets in the
portfolio), people will try to acquire other assets,
whose prices will then be bid up. Exchanges of money
for assets will continue until the increase in the gen-
eral price level reduces real money balances to their
desired level.
A crude interpretation of this theory suggests that
any decline in observed real money balances implies
a fall below some desired level. In the process of at-
tempting to restore real money balances to the desired
level, economic units sell other assets bidding down
their prices. This induces a reduction in output, em-
ployment and prices of current output. If the goal of
monetary policy is to stabilize output, employment,
and prices, a correct policy prescription would be to
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increase the stock of money in order to reverse the
process. Thus, in this situation observed real money
balances become both a predictor of changes in eco-
nomic activity and a target of monetary policy.
Such an interpretation, however, is an example of
the crudest form of monetarist thought; it assumes
that changes in economic activity emanate solely from
changes in the money stock. Only under such an
assumption can decreases in observed real money
balances be invariably interpreted as indicative of
the process described in the paragraph above. But,
as shown in the wheat example, changes in observed
real money balances can easily occur when there are
unexpected changes in output or changes in expecta-
tions, each of which can be a result of many causes.
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Again, real money balances are defined as the ratio
of nominal money balances to some generalized price
level. As Illustration I demonstrates, there can be sev-
eral causes for the decline in this ratio, indicating dif-
ferent forecasts and different policy implications.
Let us start with case I where nominal money bal-
ances decline and desired real money balances remain
constant. This is a case in which, clearly, an observed
reduction in real money balances implies an eco-
nomic contraction; the correct countercyclical policy
would be an expansion in the money stock.
In case II, nominal money balances remain con-
stant while a rising price level causes real money bal-
ances to decline. Here, these events would follow
from a decline in desired real money balances due to
an autonomous decline in wealth, the result, perhaps,
of a natural catastrophe. Since such a fall in wealth
must encompass a reduction in output, the observed
decrease in real money balances would correctly pre-
dict a recessionary tendency but would not call for
an expansionary monetary policy. With exogenous
events causing the contraction in wealth and output,
an increased money stock would only contribute to
the rising price level without countering the real
market contractive forces.
The third case is identical to II in terms of the
cause of falling real money balances except that here
desired real money balances decline because of an
expectation of accelerating inflation. Individual deci-
sionmakers would attempt to protect their real wealth
by reducing their holdings of monetary assets, includ-
ing real money balances, by buying other assets and
thus increasing the demand for output. In these cir-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1975
cumstances a decline in real money balances is as-
sociated with an increase rather than a decrease in
output; again, an increase in money stock would only
serve to reinforce anticipations of inflation and
strengthen the inflationary push.
Of these three cases, a decline in observed real
money balances gives a “correct” signal of an impend-
ing decline in output in two cases and an “incorrect”
signal in the other. In addition, only in case Ii san
offsetting increase in the money supply appropriate.
These are not the only possible situations; considera-
tion of additional cases shows observed real money
balances to be an even more unreliable indicator and
target for monetarypolicy.
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that changes
in aggregate demand produce changes in output and
prices with a lag. Thus there are at least three addi-
tional ways in which falling real balances can produce
erroneous forecasts and damaging policy prescrip-
tions. Case IV shows a decrease in currently observed
real balances resulting from an increase in the price
level which, in turn, results not from a current de-
crease in desired real money balances (as in II and
III) but from a past decrease, This could be caused
by an autonomous wealth decrease in previous pe-
riods and would not indicate a decrease in output
now or in the future. In this case output would fall
at the time of the wealth decrease, but observed real
money balances would be unchanged initially. Real
money balances would fall only later. This case would
be expected in a situation where prices are relatively
inilexible in the short run — a situation not far from
reality. Thus, although this case is analogous to case
II, it would produce both a faulty forecast (in that
the prior decrease in output was missed) and a faulty
policy recommendation.
Case Vi ssimilar to IV except that a past decline
in desired real balances is caused by a past change
in expectations regarding the future level of prices.
The current price level is rising because of a lagged
adjustment to a past disequilibrium and observed
real money balances are falling. This again does not
indicate current or future reductions in output. On
the contrary, growth of aggregate demand actually
has accelerated. The decline in observed real money
balances again emits incorrect signals with respect
to forecasts and stabilization policy.
The final alternative VI is one in which the current
price level is rising due to a past expansion in the
nominal money stock, with current and past desired
real money balances remaining constant. The current
decrease in real balances represents an adjustment to
a past increase in those balances. The implication of
this observation is that output has risen already in re-
sponse to the initial discrepancy between desired and
actual real money balances and the current price level
is rising with a lag. There is no reason to expect cur-
rent or future contractionsin output. Again, misleading
information is provided by the real money measure.
In addition to the above described alternatives,
there are numerous situations where different rates
of change may produce similar results. Their effects
are analogous.
In summary, there are three basic causes of de-
clining observed real mouey balances, each with dis-
tinct implications:’ case I, for which the forecast of
declining output and the recommendation for expan-
sive monetary policy would be correct; case II, for
which the forecast for declining output would be
correct but an expansive monetary policy would only
create or intensify inflationary pressures; and cases
1
There is also the lingering problem of measurement, ob-
served real money balances are dependent on price indexes
a,sd thus suffer all of the problems peculiar to index num-
bers. Care must be taken lest the price index replace actual
prices in the analysis,
Illustration I
SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DECLINING REAL MONEY BALANCES
CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV CASE V CASE VI
Osrrent Current Current Past Pas’ Past
Decline in Autonomouc Increase in Autonomous Inc’ease in Inc~easein
Nominal Money DecUne Expectations Decline Expectations Nominal Money
Current Observations Stock Growth in Wealth ot Inflation in Wealth of Inflation Stock Growth -
Namina~ Maney Declines Unchanaed Unchanaed Unchanged Unchonged Unchanqed Stock Growth — — -
Prco Level Unctsongcd Increases Inc’eoses Increases tncreoses Increases
Desired Real Money Balances Unchanged Declines Declines Unchonged enchanged Unchanged
Unchanqed Unchanged
Outpjt Growlt, Declsnes Declines Increases Unchanged -
or Increases or Increases





III-VI, for which the forecast would be incorrect and




The experience of the past gives several examples
of the inherent dangers of using observed real money
balances as both a forecasting device and as a target
for monetary policy. In most situations real money
balances have performed reasonably well as a pre-
cursorof declines in economic activity. The exceptions
are notable, however, and offer persuasive evidence
against the use of observed real money balances in
policy discussions.
The accompanying chart depicts corresponding
quarterly changes in real GNP, the nominal money
stock (M1), and real money balances (M1/CNP price
deflator) ~2 Simple visual inspection clearly indicates
that most of the recessions since 1947 have been
preceded by declines in real money balances and cor-
responding decreases in the rate of growth of nominal
money stock. These episodes would fall into our case
I, where decreases in real money balances resulted
from a restriction in the rate of monetary expansion.
This observation ostensibly supports changes in real
2
The chart reports the dollar change in each magnitude from
the corresponding quarter one year earlier, This procedure is
used in order to smooth the data and thus present a clearer
picture of the relationships.
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money balances as both a good forecasting device and
a good target for stabilization policy.
The 1950-51 period stands out as an exception,
and is more like case III. Although real money bal-
ances fell precipitously, the growth of nominal money
balances remained relatively constant and a recession
did not develop. The sudden outbreak of war in
Korea in 1950 apparently induced expectations of
commodity shortages resulting from anticipated
price controls and rationing programs. This mood of
speculation caused a shift in the desired portfolio of
assets that people held.3 Desired real money balances
were reduced, as an attempt was made to shift out
of money and into inventories of other assets. The
result was a rapid rise in the price level. Thus, while
observed real money balances fell sharply, aggregate
demand increased rapidly. The decline in real bal-
ances incorrectly forecast a recession and increased
growth of nominal money to offset the reduction in
real money balances would have served only to ag-
gravate the situation.
A second period in which real-balance-watching
yields faulty policy prescriptions encompasses 1973
and the first part of 1974, when the behavior of real
and nominal balances diverge sharply. It appears
that this period illustrates a combination of cases II
and VI. Although the decline in real money balances
correctly indicated the reduction of output in early
1974, expansionary monetary policy during that pe-
riod would have been powerless to stem it. The rate
of growth of nominal money did slow in 1973; but
since most, if not all, of the decline in output in the
first three quarters of 1974 was due to the wealth-
reducing effects of the energy situation, bad agri-
cultural harvests, and new government regulations,
the effect of slower money growth on economic activ-
ity is uncertain. This wealth loss would serve to re-
duce the domestic demand for real money balances.
The latter part of 1974, of course, exhibited all the
attributes of case
Su.rnrnary a-nd Cn-nclusian
There is a significant nmnber of economists and
policymakers who assert that all changes in observed
real money balances precede corresponding changes
in economic activity and that monetary policy should
be geared to counter these changes. This article at-
tempts to explain that such a view assumes that all
changes in economic activity emanate solely from
changes in the nominal money stock — an assumption
which is warranted by neither existing monetary
theory nor empirical observations.
Although it is agreed that real money balances
play a crucial role in the determination and predic-
tion of economic activity, the assertion that observed
real money balances provide us with sufficient in-
formation to make accurate predictions and policy
decisions is unwarranted. We have enumerated sev-
eral instances where changes in observed real money
balances would produce incorrect predictions and sev-
eral where, even if predictions were correct, wrong
policy proposals would result. Empirical observations
indicate that since 1947, blind reliance on observed
real money balances would have compounded cyclical
functuations on at least two occasions.
Examination of logical constructs and economic his-
tory over the past 30 years implies that changes in
nominal money balances would be a preferable pre-
dictor and target of monetary policy. This should not
surprise even those who advocate the use of observed
real money balances since it limits the changes in
these balances to a set where the causal determinant
of the change is indeed a change in the nominal
money stock. Again, the use of real balances as a
pivotal variable in economic decisionmaking is not
rejected, but it is suggested that observed real money
balances have a lower probability of correct predic-
tion of changes in economic activity and correct policy
suggestions than nominal money balances.
~The mood was, “we had better get it now while we still
can.” Thus purchases of goods and services that, in normal
times, would have taken place over a period of several
years were attempted all at once, The sharp rise in the price
level in 1950-51 was followed by several years of price con-
trols and price level stability, and there is evidence that the
level of prices in 1955 was approximately the same as what
would have been achieved without the shock of the Korean
war. Instead of rising smoothly through the 1950-55 period
prices rose very rapidly early in the period and then remained
stable. See Michael K. Evans, Macroeconomic Activity (New
York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 301.
~Advocates of the analytical power of real money balances
also point to the rate of growth of output in 1973 as
offering supporting evidence. Observed real money balances
began to decline early in the year, just as the rate of growth
of real GNP slowed markedly. There is danger here,
however, in that the initial decline in real balances resulted
from the not unexpected burst of price increases which
followed the removal of most price controls. This was a case
where behavior of the price index may have been very
different from movements in the actual level of prices.
Both theory and evidence suggest that price controls are
effective in controlling only the price index but not actual
inflation, which is then only suppressed in the data. The
actual rate of inflation during the period of controls in 1071-
72 was probably higher than reported in the indexes and was
somewhat lower in 1973. Thus actual real money balances
were probably somewhat lower than reported in 1971-72 and
somewhat higher in 1973, The decline in obsewed real
money balances in 1973 was, therefore, probably overstated.
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